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DOCTORS WITHOUT ORDERS:
American Reactions to the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919

MAY 7, 2018
BY: JAMES WATSON, CLASS OF 2018
Advisor: Professor Winston Black

Between the years of 1918-1919, the world experienced one of the worst cases of disease
ever seen. In the waning years of the Great War, countries across the world began to notice the
onset of a strange disease that appeared to be killing its victims at an alarming rate. At the time
there was much confusion and panic, and it was not until many years later that the full extent of
the pandemic came to light. This can be attributed to the fact that the pandemic struck at the end
of World War I, which overshadowed much of the early stages of the pandemic. By the end of
World War I, 126,000 American soldiers had been killed in action, despite entering the war only
during its final months. Great Britain and her Empire lost approximately 908,000 men while 1.3
million men bled their life’s blood for France. Despite this great loss of life to the war, there was
more death to come.
Thanks to historians such as Alfred Crosby, Susan Kent, John Barry and Marian Jones,
modern historians can better understand what happened. The Pandemic of 1918 infected millions
of people worldwide and killed just as often. Estimates of worldwide death to the pandemic is
difficult, as there are many places where good records simply did not exist. Conservative
estimates place the global death total at between 40-50 million. 1 In America, where this essay
shall primarily focus, the numbers echo the suffering that the rest of the world endured. More
than one-sixth of the American military fell ill with the influenza, and over 43,000 of those
infected died. When factoring in the civilian population, the best estimate of Americans killed by
the pandemic is around 675,000. 2 Such a catastrophe like the pandemic caused ripples within the
United States, forcing the entire country to adapt in order to survive.
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The disease was named the “Spanish influenza”, as the first internationally reported cases
were from Spain, which remained neutral during World War I and thus had no censorship of its
media. While the origin of the pandemic is unknown, the first clear reports of the pandemic
occurring came from an army camp in Kansas. Though it is difficult to place the geographic
origin of the pandemic, the methods by which it was transmitted are understood. 3 In America,
the disease spread rapidly through cantonments, or temporary camps that housed soldiers during
World War 1. The disease also spread rapidly by means of the sea lanes that were so vital to the
Allied Powers during the war. The tight quarters on the ships meant that a single infected soldier
could make his entire regiment sick by the time the boat reached France or England. Deaths due
to influenza on board the ships were often noted, but few were reported, for fear of causing panic
among soldiers or the general public 4. As the war drew to a close, many believed that the dying
was finally over, but the sad fact was that it had only just begun.
This strain of influenza was especially deadly, as well as unique, as it seemed to target
not only the old and young but those who were strong and healthy. Traditional strains of the flu
are normally deadly only to those with weakened immune systems. The fact that all people of all
age groups were dying of the flu made this strain particularly terrifying. Individuals between the
years of 20-40 were the primary victims of the pandemic, creating a mortality spike that is not
commonly associated with the influenza virus. It was only with modern scientific techniques
that, in 1996, it was discovered that this specific strain of influenza was a precursor to the
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H1N1virus. 5 This is an especially deadly strain of influenza that kills through secondary
complications such as toxemia and vasomotor depression. Toxemia is a deadly condition that
often occurs in pregnant women that can result in the death of both mother and child. Vasomotor
depression entails the rapid dilating of veins, especially to the brain. When this occurs, a person
experiences an increase in blood pressure which leads to a myriad of other problems including
stroke and hypertension. A diagnosis of “Spanish flu” normally resulted in eventual death,
though there were some who managed to survive. As the disease spread across America,
something had to be done to assuage the suffering of the citizens. But this crisis was too big for
one group to handle, and it would take the combined efforts of two strong American
organizations to stem the tide.
While there were several smaller groups that rose to the occasion, there were two that
stood far above the rest in both scope and influence. The two in question are the United States
Armed Forces and the American Red Cross (ARC). While the operations of these two
organizations covered the majority of the continental United States, as well as overseas
operations, I will examine their contributions in major cities. The cities in question are Boston,
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. By examining their response protocols, implementation of relief
strategies and their interactions with each other and other support groups, I will illustrate the
beginnings of national disaster response initiatives. Without the pioneering actions of these
organizations, it is unlikely that there would be such detailed crisis management plans within the
national government in the modern day.
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The purpose of this essay will be two-fold. The first being the explanation and
description of the structure and methods of response taken by the United States Army and the
American Red Cross during the pandemic years. The second is to present and carefully analyze
the interactions between the two organizations. In addition, this work will also examine
organizational structure, inter-organizational interactions, and preferred methods of handling
influenza outbreaks. In doing so, this work will be one of the first to seriously consider the
notion that the actions, and inactions, of these two groups were fundamental in both pandemic
relief and as the cornerstone for future relief efforts in the United States and abroad.
The Armed Forces was one of the first institutions struck by the pandemic, so it is only
natural that it played a leading role in the attempts to control and rebuff the advances of the
disease. Similarly, the ARC was instrumental once it became clear that the disease had spread
beyond the control of any one organization. Since both groups were focused on the same goal,
they often crossed paths. The pandemic years, despite how brief they were, revealed many of the
discrepancies that were once hidden within the internal structure of the military as well as the
ARC. America, like many nations around the world, was wholly surprised by the ferocity of the
pandemic. The country had to rely on a relatively newly organized ARC for its primary response,
despite the fact that most trained personnel were overseas. In addition, the ARC was not
centralized in the way that the military was. There was no incentive for the chapters of the ARC
to follow orders sent from Washington. Despite this, the two were linked for better or for worse.
In the early stages of the American war effort, the ARC was combined with the military as an
auxiliary group as the soldiers would require nurses, such is the nature of war. This meant that
during the pandemic, the two sides would naturally interact. However, it was not always clear as
to who should answer to whom. On the one hand, the military has the final say when it comes to
4

the care of its soldiers and installations. This is in addition to directing overseas detachments and
ensuring that they are supplied and fit for duty. Conversely, the ARC is primarily a volunteer,
civilian based organization that is also tied to the American government. They take their orders
from their headquarters in Washington, though their ability or willingness to follow through with
such orders, which will be discussed later, left something to be desired. This disconnect, coupled
with conflicting views on how to adequately control the pandemic, led to instances where both
sides worked together and others where they disagreed.
When discussing a topic as nuanced as the Influenza Pandemic of 1918, it is important
first to understand the virus itself. In doing so, it becomes possible to expand one’s
understanding of the impacts of the virus on society and the world at large. As the disease began
to spread along the naval routes that connected much of the developed world, so too did the
world begin to take notice. The pandemic struck the United States in three separate waves, the
first during March and April of 1918, the second and deadliest from August to September 1918
and the third wave beginning in February of 1919 6. It was not until 1996, that by using preserved
lung tissue from several victims, scientists were able to reconstruct the RNA sequence that made
up the virus 7. In doing so, it became possible to cross-reference the data with symptoms that
were recorded by witnesses and survivors of the pandemic. Through this method, the pandemic
could be understood in greater detail, specifically in its biological terms. It was discovered that
the influenza of 1918-1919 was a form of HINI flu virus and bears strikingly similar base
pairings with the avian flu IAV. Due to this similarity, some consider the 1918 flu a “founder
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virus” 8, which means that all daughter strains originated from this kind of virus. Thus, it can be
concluded that the virus has since mutated into varying forms and is still at large, though it no
longer bears resemblance to its original form. Ever since this discovery, the disease has been
referred to by some as “the genetic mother of all influenza pandemics” 9.
As for its physical effects on the body, the influenza of 1918 was not the primary cause of
death. The disease would weaken the body to such an extent that it could no longer fight off
other infections. Thus, it was often noted that patients died of secondary conditions, particularly
pneumonia. It was also reported that patients underwent severe mental trauma, including
depression, anxiety and occasionally, mania. Due to later research the exact mechanism of the
virus came to light, which showed that the virus killed by turning the body on itself. When the
body released antibodies to combat the virus, it would mistakenly destroy healthy lung tissue that
the virus was attacking. In this way, a person’s lungs would become damaged and they would
effectively drown in their own fluids 10.
It was not only the symptoms that baffled responders to the pandemic, but also the
extremely high mortality rate that went along with it. Standard seasonal influenza is normally
only a danger to those with weak immune systems, which traditionally refers to the very old and
very young. However, the influenza of 1918 failed to play by those rules. In addition to the old
and the young dying, there was an excessively high amount of individuals between the ages of
20-40 that perished. Essentially, the virus killed humans that should be in their prime, when the
immune system is strongest. 11 This unexpected aspect to the pandemic terrified many, especially
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those instructed to treat the afflicted. Treating the disease was especially difficult, as the true
cause was unknown. Standard treatments proved to be ineffective, and the most doctors and
nurses could do was to try and ease the pain and hope the patient recovered. The historian Susan
Kent accurately summarizes the reason for the lack of effective treatments by doctors, as the
approach of doctors during the pandemic focused on treatments that required the disease to be a
bacillus. The unfortunate reality was that the pandemic was a virus, and the treatments therefore
had no effect. 12 Physicians were often at a loss and would prescribe whatever was at hand,
sometimes even home remedies in the hope of finding a solution that worked. While the doctors
and scientist lamented their shortcomings, nurses provided a crucial role in the pandemic
response.
The pandemic that occurred during 1918-1919 was on a scale that had never been seen
before in modern history. It also occurred during a time of terrible warfare, which only
magnified the crisis beyond its already formidable scope. In face of such conditions, it fell to the
organizations within America to rise up and combat the disease in any way they could.
Throughout the many bouts of influenza, different organizations sprang up to combat the
pandemic. Chief among them were the US Armed Forces and the ARC, as both spearheaded the
first major efforts to combat the pandemic.
Perhaps the most influential organization was the United States military, as it was the
first to experience the trials of the pandemic. The two were closely intertwined, as the first
records of the pandemic occurred within military installations, specifically cantonments. Within
the army camps, thousands of men would live in tight quarters as they prepared to embark for the
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Western Front. Because American troops were so desperately needed by the Entente powers, the
camps took in more men than they could normally handle. The crowding of troops within the
camps, combined with an understaffed medical corps created the perfect atmosphere for the
spread of disease. Under such conditions, Kent postulates that this environment within the camps
and in the trenches created the perfect environment for the pandemic to arise: “The condition of
this war may well have enabled a common and usually mild disease to mutate into a deadly
strain…Taking advantage of thousands of people congregating together in army camps and
hospitals…” 13 While there is a certain logic to this theory, there is a problem with it. This theory
does not explain how such a virus could appear almost simultaneously in different places around
the world. At the same time, the pandemic was already a problem in army camps before the
soldiers went to France. It might be more accurate to say that the conditions on the Western
Front accelerated the transmission of the virus between men. If clear lines of transmission could
one day be confirmed, this theory might gain more credence. Once the virus took hold within a
camp, it would spread like wildfire, infecting hundreds of men every day. Camp medical staff
would be quickly overwhelmed by the number of cases, and were shocked to discover that this
seemingly ordinary flu was cutting through the ranks like machinegun fire. The pandemic
therefore followed the soldiers overseas and wreaked havoc among the soldiers on both sides of
the trenches.
As the death toll mounted both at home and abroad, the Army Medical Department raced
to find answers. This organization was rigidly structured and focused more for the whole and less
on the individual, functioning more like public medicine than private 14. This is due to the
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widespread focus of the organization. It is meant to deliver healthcare to large numbers of
individuals, which means that it cannot afford to personalize. If it were to do so, the department
would risk becoming mired in more bureaucratic problems than it already was. This would lead
to a decrease in efficiency and would severely hinder its efforts. Despite the large staff in the
Medical Corps, Army doctors suffered the same problems as their civilian counterparts. The
large numbers of soldiers falling to influenza and not bullets put a severe dent in both the Allied
and Central armies, indicating that this was truly a threat to all nations. When the soldiers
returned home, they brought the disease that took hold of the men within the trenches back to the
cities on the East Coast, where the disease took root and quickly spread among the civilian
population. The military quickly responded by ordering quarantines of all army camps as well as
screening naval ships for sick sailors. 15 Medical staff on the Western Front also suggested that
more room be given for soldiers so that the disease spread slower, but they often found their
requests denied due to circumstance. The hope for improvement often had to be put aside in the
reality of warfare on the Western Front: “Surgeon General Gorgas had recommended that Army
housing provide 60 square feet per man, but did not often prevail. As Gorgas told one training
camp commander, ‘We know perfectly well that we can control pneumonia absolutely if we
could avoid crowding the men, but it is not practicable in military life to avoid this crowding.” 16
As Byerly displays, there is a kind of hypocrisy in the words of Surgeon General Gorgas. It
appears as though he is simply lamenting the fact that his hands are tied in regards to improving
ground conditions overseas. Gorgas implies that the situation is out of his hands, that the
sickness is an unfortunate consequence of war. Though the validity of his words are unclear, as
he is the Surgeon General. His words carry immense weight within the military hierarchy, and
15
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though he cannot order something to be done, his recommendations can be very influential. Yet
he does not continue to press his case, he merely bows before the ‘status quo’ and refuses to push
any harder for sanitation reform.
Creating a healthy and medically safe environment is not practical, so says Army High
Command. In the modern day this sort of excuse would not be accepted, but in this moment it
was considered to be a perfectly valid reason. This offers a window into the overarching attitude
of the military towards the war. The conditions on the ground are what they are, and it is beyond
the ability of Command to change them. Do what must be done and the consequences must come
as they may. Altering the status quo requires more effort than can be afforded, so why should
they waste time and resources at an effort that has already been declared impossible? The
conditions for the individual soldier do not appear to factor significantly when it came to
calculating the arithmetic of war. Despite this attitude, the Army still recognized when help was
required. At times, the camps would accept and offer assistance to other organizations, but rarely
if ever offered assistance to civilian populations. In one case, a cantonment in Ohio rebuffed the
American Red Cross aid to treat sick soldiers. 17 This is an indication that those from a more rigid
structuring preferred to handle the situation themselves without outside help.
Continuing with the theme of public health, perhaps the most well-known humanitarian
organization was the American Red Cross (ARC). The American Red Cross was founded in
1881 by Clara Barton in the aftermath of the Civil War. Having recently mobilized to assist the
Allies in World War I the ARC responded en masse to the call for aid during the pandemic years.
Their actions are well-documented and were often publicized in newspapers and magazines both
"Red Cross Rebuff at Big University." Ohio State Journal (Columbus, OH), October 24, 1918.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0110flu.0003.110.
17
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then and in the following years. Unlike the US military, which preferred to keep the situation
within the training camps and other military installations in check, the Red Cross had a presence
across the country. Thus, they adhered to their original mission, to alleviate human suffering no
matter where it is found or who suffers as a result of disaster. During its expansion, the Red
Cross was completely volunteer based, so it engaged in a sort of political propaganda to
encourage people to step up. They created ads that appeared in major newspapers across the
country, including the following example from the Dallas Morning News. “Major Townes has
issued the following appeal: The emergency is great and it is a patriotic duty and a privilege to
care for our Texas boys sick in various camps. All nurses indicated are badly needed
immediately.” 18 They borrowed the patriotic imagery that was used by the Army to recruit
soldiers during the war. By doing so, they evoked the same message of crisis and need for
volunteers that the war had done. It should be noted that before the entrance of America into the
Great War, no such propaganda created by the ARC existed. Any, if some could be found, based
their message on the traditional neutral values such as humanitarianism. In addition, the ARC
pushed nurses through training so they could swell the ranks, as there were far too few nurses to
aid the afflicted. Through these methods, the Red Cross became successful in recruiting
volunteers, despite the obvious risks of infection and death. As was recorded within the ARC
databases, “A total of 223 nurses and five dieticians are known to have died while providing aid
to flu victims.” 19 For an organization that started with such small numbers, as well as the fact
that ARC personnel rarely faced death, the Pandemic is a singular event. This was a crisis unlike
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any other, and it quickly became apparent that they needed help. For the ARC, there was no
better place to turn than the federal government. It is in this regard that the American Red Cross
differs from the other aid-giving organizations; no other became as politically intertwined as they
did.
This allowed them access to more resources than smaller organizations, yet they were
occasionally bogged down by their connections, as they had to gain approval from certain
officials before they could administer treatments and aid. More importantly, the ARC had a
central bureaucracy based in Washington D.C, creating a physical attachment to the national
government. As will be described later in greater detail, the political nature of the ARC leaders
would lead to issues in dealing with the pandemic. In addition, the ARC was not centralized like
its military counterpart. The organization was broken up into chapters, which normally operated
as autonomous units. The chapters operated independently of the local governments, meaning
that they worked with them but rarely needed overt permission beyond standard legal
procedures. Yet during the pandemic years, it was recognized that this pattern did not continue.
As an excerpt from a December 1918 article from the Atlanta Constitution shows, the local
chapter needed official permission, or at least recognition, from the local government before they
could proceed with their duty. “Dr. C. G. Applewhite, in charge of the federal bureau of health
here [Atlanta], has given his approval for the movement inaugurated by the Red Cross and being
carried on by the women of the city to combat the spread of influenza”. 20 With the issue of
having to answer to local authority before providing assistance; coupled with the fact that they
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did not know how to properly treat the pandemic meant that at times their efforts were often
hindered.
The magnitude of the crisis was beyond the imagination of anyone at the time of the
breakout. This forced both national organizations and ordinary civilians to adopt new methods of
disease prevention. For the first time, surgical masks were produced on an industrial scale and
distributed to the population to avoid the spread of contaminants. In many places, wearing masks
in public was enforced by law. In places such as San Francisco, which was already recovering
from the devastating 1906 earthquake, state officials found it difficult to enforce these policies as
the pandemic wore on. In the case of surgical masks, the public was initially receptive and
compliant. This would change as the pandemic continued to cause misery amongst the citizenry
and people began to lose faith in their public officials. The enforced wearing of masks was soon
seen by many as frivolous and ultimately futile. 21 Issues such as the one previously mentioned
would be repeated in various forms across the country as political officials were forced to
contend with such an unknown as the pandemic. In places such as Pittsburgh and Boston, the
discrepancies between the orders given to ARC ground forces and the implementation of such
orders varied intensely. The Army did not experience deviations from established orders due to
its inherent rigid structure. Unlike the ARC, the military had an already established tradition of
obedience towards superiors. Therefore, when an order to reduce troop numbers within a
cantonment was handed down, those receiving the orders would immediately comply without
asking questions. This tradition did not exist within the ARC, which would lead to disobedience
of orders by certain chapters who felt that they understood the situation better than their
superiors in Washington. Despite this tradition of obedience, since they were one of the first
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groups to experience the full capacity of the pandemic, Army Command was forced to contend
with the notion that previous methods were insufficient.
Traditionally, flu was regarded with minimal concern, as the disease itself was not
normally deadly. When the first cases of influenza began to emerge in places such as Camp
Devens, a few miles outside of Boston, most officials paid it little mind. Flu, or grippe, was not
considered a reportable disease, meaning that early records of influenza are either incomplete or
nonexistent in some cases. Normally, a soldier with the flu would be bedridden for about a week
and would be back on duty soon after. This was not the case in 1918, as this strain of flu was
often followed by pneumonia, which was a killer disease. Over the span of three weeks, from
September 7th to the 23rd, Devens reported over twelve thousand cases of influenza, sixty-six of
whom died from complications resulting from the disease 22. Camp Devens was only among the
first of many cantonments to be struck by the Spanish influenza. The United States Army was
wholly unprepared to handle a catastrophe such as the influenza pandemic. By 1918, America
was fully committed to the war effort, with several divisions already overseas and enrollment in
the millions. Due to the rapid rise in volunteers and the ever-present request for more men from
the Allies, the Army had to speed up the training process. This meant two things: one, each
training camp would need to take on as many men as possible, and the second is that they would
be training around the clock. While individually, this might appear harmless and at best, an
effective way to get men ready for war. The issue arises from the fact that they were combined.
In the case of Fort Devens, the standard carrying capacity of the camp was 35,000. When the
outbreak of influenza began in September of 1918, Devens housed nearly 45,000 men. 23 By
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putting so many individuals in enclosed spaces, especially with those that are exhausted from
constant activity and the lower quality hygiene that comes with a crowded facility, it creates the
perfect environment for disease to spread. Yet once the danger became clear, the War
Department acted quickly. In a series of telegrams between Surgeon General Charles Richards
and the Secretary of War, a plan is quickly put together to deal with the crisis. The eventual
consensus was to quarantine the camp and prevent the shift of healthy men into Camp Devens. 24
In doing so, they hoped to reduce the damage caused by the disease. The unfortunate nature of
such correspondence was that it took time. Once the consensus was reached, orders handed down
and then carried out, signs of the pandemic had already appeared in other camps.
Between March and April of 1918, over a dozen American military camps experienced
the disease with varying degrees of severity. 25 The standard response for flu outbreaks was
rudimentary at best, because for the most part, the flu virus did not kill. It especially did not
bring down soldiers, who were at the peak of physical fitness. Cases of influenza mounted
quickly across the network of camps along with the number of dead. Time after time, camp
medical staff found themselves at a total loss as to how to alleviate the suffering. In addition,
they were almost always outnumbered by the sick and in multiple cases, the staff fell ill as well,
further hampering efforts to stop the spread of the illness. At first, Army Surgeon General
Charles Richard recommended increasing medical personnel and reducing crowding on overseas
troop transports. 26 He wrote a lengthy telegram to Army Chief of Staff, imploring to reduce
overcrowding on ships as well as expertly detailing how and why the pandemic spread. The
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telegram was sent on October 1, 1918. Four days later on October 5th, the Secretary of War
responded with the following: “In view or the instructions which have already issued from the
War Department on the subject of physical examinations and inspections prior to departure from
camps and prior to embarkation, your recommendation for a reduction in the transport capacity
to 50 per cent, and that troops be held in quarantine for one week prior to embarkation, is
disapproved.” 27 By this time, the pandemic was a well-known fact amongst military brass,
though they willfully ignored the advice of the Surgeon General. The initial telegram clearly
displays that Richard knew what he was talking about, he was by no means making up numbers.
Yet he was overruled by the War Department, clearly showing who had the higher priority.
Though in many cases, the best way to control the spread of the disease was to quarantine
each infected camp and prevent the physical travels of the soldiers to uninfected areas. However
in most cases, the disease had already spread to the surrounding areas and quarantine was a moot
point. A good example of this was the transfer of the flu to Chicago, a city so deep in the interior
that it would be difficult to imagine how a disease that began near the coast would penetrate so
deep. The Navy was the branch responsible for this outbreak, as sailors stationed in coastal ports
transferred into the Great Lakes. “…the Great Lakes Training Station thirty-odd miles from
Chicago. Flu first appeared at this station on September 11, and in a week there were 2,600 in a
hospital prepared for no more than 1,800. All liberty for men of the Great Lakes Station was
canceled on September 19, but it was much too late. The pandemic started in Chicago, the
nation’s biggest rail center, about three days later…” 28 This excerpt from Crosby serves two
purposes in regards to this work as a whole. The first being an excellent example as to how
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quickly the pandemic spread and the second as a demonstration of the sluggish response. The
pandemic appeared in Chicago, which was nearly forty miles from the naval yard, only ten days
after it first appeared. It took nearly a week for those in command to realize the danger and
quarantine the camp.
A similar problem occurred in Detroit, which was a major industrial hub at the time.
When the pandemic began to show amongst the men in the military camps, Surgeon General
Richards again telegrammed a request that the camp be quarantined in order to protect the
workers in the factories. The reply from the War Department simply read, “No action appears
necessary.” 29 Such a delay once again demonstrates the unwillingness of the military command
to hamper the war effort in any way. While the War Department was quite swift in dealing with a
problem once it had arisen, as with the case in Camp Devens, they did not heed the foresight of
others. This attitude prevented the possible prevention of the spread of the pandemic. In doing
so, it guaranteed that this kind of situation would constantly repeat itself within military
installations across the country. With such apparent resistance to the possibility of reducing the
effectiveness of the war machine, this meant it was much harder to make larger adjustments,
especially the reduction of troop transports overseas.
As the pattern of infection began to form in the minds of Army coordinators, it became
apparent that the disease was also following the doughboys over to England and France. Thus, it
became necessary to slow down the shipments of troops as well as their rate of training. It was
their intention to reduce the rate of infection between the continents as well as ensure what
troops did make it to Europe were healthy and in fighting shape. However, there was controversy
Chamberlain, COL. Weston P., M.C. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War. Vol. VI.
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29
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over how to do this without severely damaging the Allied war effort. When Acting Army
Surgeon General Charles Richard approached Army Chief of Staff Peyton March about the issue,
he recommended a one-week quarantine of every troop ship before launch and to reduce their
capacity by one-half. March would have none of this, fearing potential weakness in the American
sector without enough men. March countered with intensive screening by medical personnel
stating, “It is impossible for medical officers to state with any degree of safety that any particular
command is free from infection, or that it may safely embark on troopships for overseas
service.” 30 March and Richard eventually reached an agreement over a basic reduction in troop
transports to Europe, but it was not without drawing the attention of President Wilson. “Troop
shipments to France were cut by 10 percent and more, the number of soldiers for each seat and
berth on troop trains was reduced to one, and on October 11 the War Department ordered a
reduction in the intensity of training at all army camps.” 31 Unfortunately these measures were
too little and too late for thousands of men who had already succumbed to the disease. By the
end of October 1918, nearly 14,000 servicemen had died without ever seeing battle. 32 Only once
the draft was cancelled at the end of October by Provost Marshall did the camps finally
experience a dramatic decrease in influenza cases.
The Armed forces did not experience the pandemic all at once, nor was there a linear
progression from one side of the country to the other. The disease followed the movement of
people, along sea lanes, roads and railroads. It started first in the training camps and ports, then
spread outwards to nearby towns and cities. The pandemic travelled to Europe with the
doughboys, infecting both Allied and Central soldiers, weakening armies on both sides. Despite
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the massive increase in the Medical Corps, the US Army was woefully unprepared for the
magnitude of the pandemic. But they did not battle the disease on their own, for there was one
other group whose sole purpose is to fight not men, but the suffering of men.
The American Red Cross is widely considered to be America’s leading humanitarian
organization, taking part in relief missions both around the world and across the country. While
the Red Cross as an organization had been present since 1864, no such branch had been
established in America. This changed when in 1881 Clara Barton founded the American Red
Cross, an internationally recognized branch of the International Red Cross whose core values
centered on the idea of “a single independent, nationwide, permanent disaster relief
organization.” 33 It was also important that the ARC would be neutral in all things, offering aid to
those who require it no matter the circumstances. Simply declaring neutrality is an easy thing to
do, and it also gives the organization the ability to always claim the moral high ground.
However, this is not always an easy promise to keep.
By the time World War I began, the ARC had cemented its position in America by
contributing aid to victims of a multitude of natural disasters; including the Russian famine in
1891, the Great San Francisco earthquake in 1906, and the 1913 Dayton Ohio flood. The
organization functioned as a semi-political organism, receiving direction from a board of
members that elected their own president. The President of the United States actually had the
honorary role of head of the ARC board of consultation, until President Roosevelt resigned from
the position in 1903. 34 Despite this, the ARC remained tied into American politics, as this was
the source of their legitimacy as an organization. When an earthquake ravaged San Francisco, the
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ARC functioned less as a relief organization and more like a group of bank managers. Moreover,
they were not the ones who organized the main response. In actuality, the US Army took care of
most of the ground operations, including tasks like providing shelter and controlling rationing. It
should also be noted that the ARC negotiated with the army for even partial control over relief
efforts. In addition, latent political opinions possibly hampered or even prevented sufficient aid
from reach San Francisco’s Asian populations. While government administration touted the
ARC’s performance in San Francisco as a way to restore the organization’s image after internal
power struggles exposed some scandals within the organization. The San Francisco quake was a
turning point for the ARC as an organization, as its core values seemed to take a shift away from
tradition. The definition of humanitarian aid appeared to take on a new connotation, trading
sympathy for efficiency. In addition, the stance of neutrality was instead used to gain footholds
in business deals and ruthlessly calculate aid for affected areas. “Instead, beginning with the San
Francisco earthquake, the ARC used its neutral status to negotiate working relationships with
various business and government interests and thus develop a unified and effective relief
program.” 35 This would help pave the way for a massive increase in ARC growth in both
numbers and political power. Its growth was just in time for the greatest war that humanity had
ever seen, as well as the deadly aftershock of disease.
In 1914, Europe was consumed by the fires of war and the ARC quickly went to work
preparing a response. They created divisions of nurses and medical personnel to be sent overseas,
as well as starting a large fundraising campaign for combatants and afflicted civilians on both
sides. Unfortunately, their rapid response soon faltered and ground to a halt as the war continued
through 1914 and into 1915. In addition to the isolationist movement removing donors, the Allies
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began to successfully block ARC shipments to the Central Powers. Everything would change
once the United States entered the war in 1918. The traditional stance on complete neutrality
evaporated overnight and was replaced with the sentiments of patriotism to stand alongside the
traditional humanitarian value. This new patriotic stance was used to successfully increase the
ranks of the ARC, as well as open new doors in government. Enrollment in the ARC skyrocketed
during the short time America was at war, and the number of chapters multiplied exponentially.
“In 1915 the organization had only twenty-two thousand members; just four years later, it had
enlisted more than 20 million adult members…” 36 The neutrality of the ARC was officially
suspended for the war by the War Council, and it was even attached to the United States military
as an auxiliary group. Moreover, President Wilson created a Red Cross War Council, run by
politicians and professional businessmen who turned the ARC into a wartime organization. With
this rapid growth came the need for reorganization, which is when regional chapters were
installed. They were to act as satellites for the main office in Washington D.C. as well as serve
their region in times of strife. However, each of the fourteen chapters would be ultimately
beholden to the orders that came from the main office. Each would be semi-independent, as there
was no efficient way to enforce the will of the main office. While this method was
extraordinarily efficient at recruiting new members at collecting donations, there was a serious
flaw that would not be fully exposed until a crisis much closer to home came to light.
As the American war machine kicked into overdrive during the spring and summer of
1918, the pandemic began to crop up all across the country. Influenza had already become
virulent in several military encampments across the country. But as previously demonstrated,
these measures did not stop the spread of flu to civilian populations. The ARC was already hard
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at work, with nurses already being called to service both at home and abroad. Many of the
experienced nurses were either sent overseas or requested to assist in the Army cantonments.
Stateside and urban chapters were therefore seriously understaffed as the scope of the pandemic
came to be realized. Thousands of nurses were overseas directly aiding the war effort, which
meant that for the first few months of the pandemic in America, most chapters worked off of
skeleton crews and half-trained volunteers. One of the first cities to be struck by the pandemic
was Boston, as it was an important port for the transport of troops to Great Britain, as well as a
strategic naval installation. As thousands of dock workers and civilians began turning up with
signs of influenza, the Boston chapter felt the pressure of the lack of trained staff. Under a
directive from the Washington office, once new nurses were admitted to the chapter, they would
be organized and directed by the Public Health Service (PHS). However, the Bostonian nurses
blatantly ignored the order, stating: “The division office has not provided nurses and supplies at
the request of the Public Health authorities as the Public Health authorities have not been on the
job.” 37 The Boston chapter also switched from wartime activities to flu prevention and civilian
relief. They circulated pamphlets that warned people about the influenza and how to prevent its
spread several months before the PHS issued an official version. By the time the illness had run
its course, over six thousand Bostonians had succumbed to influenza and pneumonia. 38 Though
despite being one of the first chapters to experience the pandemic, the Boston chapter was seen
as a model for other chapters to imitate. Their commitment to the alleviation of human suffering
and dedication to the citizenry proved to be effective in combating the influenza. Though they
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were criticized for ignoring national directives, the New England divisions were not the only
ARC groups to ignore orders from Washington.
The pandemic quickly spread from the coastlines to the interior, infecting major cities
such as New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Pittsburgh. Though other cities had
advanced warnings and could prepare in ways coastal cities like Boston and Seattle could not,
the response was not always uniform. Both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were hit with the
pandemic around the same time, though the ARC response differed greatly between the two
cities. Philadelphia was hit hard, the pandemic threw the city into chaos despite the advanced
warning from ARC branches to the North. Citizens from all walks of life contracted the flu,
paralyzing emergency services, garbage collectors and even the telephone companies. 39 The
Philadelphia chapter experienced the same hardships as other ARC groups, the lack of trained
staff and the sheer volume of cases made a centralized response difficult at best. The entire city
felt the shortage of workers in all walks of life. Police officers, telephone operators, and, most
importantly, morticians. Without the means to properly prepare bodies and bury them, the dead
quite literally piled up. Eyewitness accounts all experienced the horror of seeing their dead
neighbors and fellow citizens, as Crosby summarizes in the following: “They were piled three
and four deep in the corridors and in almost every room, covered only with dirty and often
bloodstained sheets. Most were unembalmed and without ice. Some were mortifying and
emitting a nauseating stench.” 40 The ARC could not assist with burials, as they were so
understaffed that they could not provide trained morticians, so they set their few volunteers to
other tasks until new morticians could be transported from elsewhere in the country. They
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donated dozens of vehicles to act as ambulances to transport the sick, as well as setting up
dozens of soup kitchens across the city. The ARC in Philadelphia distributed thousands of flu
masks, and provided nursing care to untold numbers of the afflicted. While there was no outright
cure, they provided the best care that they could. By the time the pandemic burned itself out in
early November, over twelve thousand civilians had died. 41
On the other side of Pennsylvania, the city of Pittsburgh was also coming to grips with
the pandemic. While it hit around the same time as Philadelphia, the disease did not peak until
after the wave in Philadelphia. This gave the ARC in Pittsburgh some much needed information
as to how bad the situation could get. They worked closely with city officials to prepare for the
pandemic, and headed missions to provide care for patients both in and around the city. The
biggest concern that both ARC and city officials had was how to avoid the problems that
Philadelphia faced, most notably the lack of coffins to bury the dead. To avoid this, the chapter
leaders advised the city to confine all shipments of caskets to Allegheny County and improved
railroad systems to increase the shipments of caskets into the city. 42 In addition, the ARC took
charge in the distribution of foodstuffs, medicine and clothing to the afflicted. It was also under
chapter direction that all hospice supplies would be contained solely to Allegheny Country.
When it came to the actual distribution of necessary goods, it seemed that the Pittsburgh chapter
followed its own hierarchy of needs. “Military hospitals and camps were to receive first priority,
followed by coal plants and war production plants. Civilians' needs came last.” 43 This would
prove crucial in analyzing Pittsburgh’s response, as they were one of the only chapters that put
military needs over civilians. In short, they prioritized keeping the American war machine
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functioning instead of ensuring that the civilian population was taken care of. In addition, they
actively prevented aid in the form of nurses and goods from reaching surrounding areas. To
many, this appeared to be a very selfish and cold way of deciding who is more deserving of help.
On the other hand, one might cite that they were following orders from their superiors, as the
ARC was beholden to the military and in times of war militaristic needs come first. While it is
unknown if this policy caused more harm than good, it did not serve the ARC’s image of a
benevolent force. The Pittsburgh chapter faced angry scrutiny from Washington headquarters,
though others, specifically local political figures, were impressed by their commitment to the war
effort. It is important to note that by the time the pandemic had reached its zenith in Pittsburgh,
the military had already begun their cutback programs to reduce the speed at which men and
materials were flowing across the Atlantic. In the grand scheme of the American war machine, it
is difficult to predict if the ARC chapter’s decisions truly made as much of an impact as they
hoped.
As previously stated, the military and the ARC were, on paper, two sides of the same
coin. The ARC was added into the fold of the armed forces to augment and assist its proceedings
both in the states and overseas. This would prove to be both a benefit and a demerit throughout
the pandemic years. The once small and loose organization soon became a cog in the American
war machine, adding their knowledge and experience to aid the fallen. Those who were
considered trained enough were sent overseas, while those who were not remained at home and
practiced for the realities of war. “The Red Cross assisted by recruiting trained nurses for the
Army Nurse Corps and organizing ambulance companies and 50 hospitals of 1,000 beds each out
of American universities and medical institutions.” 44 This worked in their favor as the ARC was

44

Byerly, The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919, 85

25

granted access to the full industrial might of America, allowing medical supplies and equipment
to be produced on a scale that had never been seen before. By becoming associated with the
military, their industry, namely the industry of health, was then seen as essential. The industrious
nature of America was put to both the production of war materials as well as medicinal remedies.
Yet for this transition to be successful, something had to be done about the internal nature of the
ARC. With such a meandering method of communication between the chapters and
headquarters, creating a unified front against either the war, or the unforeseen pandemic, would
be nearly impossible. This is why a great change would come upon the ARC in the months
leading up to the war.
Before the war began in earnest, the ARC underwent a massive structural reconstruction,
modeled off of American corporations. The intention was to reorganize how the ARC was able
to respond to the increasing tensions in Europe in an effective manner and in tandem with other
aspects of American business. The architect behind this reorganization was Harvey Gibson, who
was a New York bank manager and a friend of Chairman Wadsworth. These two men foresaw
the troubles in Europe and decided that the ARC needed to be ready to meet the demand for
medical care. Whereas before the reorganization, the chapters decided how to allocate resources
and departments within the organization were loosely defined. But as the prospect of war grew
near, the possibility of joining with the army effort became more likely. The ARC had to be
ready, or so Gibson and Wadsworth believe, and if this meant challenging the old order and
values, then so be it. As a way of illustrating the changes made within the ARC, Jones highlights
the creation of new departments within the ARC. Such departments had not existed in such a
centralized manner beforehand, so their presence at this moment in time is especially
noteworthy: “Gibson and Chairman Wadsworth began by organizing the ARC into twelve
26

divisions – which during the war expanded to fourteen – and then quickly hired managers and
staff for these units. The national headquarters retained the existing departments of military
relief, civilian relief, nursing, promotion of chapter activities, and publicity, while adding new
departments of service, standards, transportation and supply service, and women’s work.” 45 This
was very new to the ARC, something that had not been attempted before. Now the ARC looks,
on paper at least, very much like a corporation. In this way, central headquarters now has
jurisdiction over very specific aspects of ARC actions. Before this, such dealings were left to the
individual chapters. It is another example of the degradation of ARC tradition and the slow
movement towards centralization.
More often than not, the protocol was to leave the other group to its own sphere of
influence. After all, the Army had a war to win and thus put the majority of its energy into
European affairs. This is made clearer by their slow realization as to the true nature of the
pandemic and their hesitation to slow down troop transports indicated where their true priorities
were. When ARC personnel voyaged overseas to the Western Front, the Army was more or less
in charge. It was a clear hierarchy that was to be followed during wartime. This is further
reflected in their stateside policy, which was relegated to military instillations. The military held
absolute authority over the cantonment camps, as well as any internal supply lines that fed the
American war machine. When it came to urban affairs or the public sphere, they had no official
policy. Thus, they left those matters to the ARC, which created an interesting dynamic. The two
organizations already had a history of not seeing eye-to-eye, as primarily demonstrated after the
1906 San Francisco earthquake. During the relief and reconstruction phases after the earthquake,
the Army took charge of the situation which meant that the ARC had to play by their rules.
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While doing so worked out for an overall benefit, it pushed the ARC into a role that they were
not used to, as subservient to the military. As demonstrated by the interactions between Edward
Devine, the appointed ARC representative for San Francisco disaster relief, and General Greely,
the officer in charge of all military operations in the area at the time. “Since the army was
already doing so much work, Devine had to negotiate a way for the American Red Cross to insert
itself into the relief process without stepping on military toes. Even though the army had
assumed control of relief ‘without the strict letter of the law,’ in General Greely’s words, and
although these duties rightly belonged to the ARC under its federal charter, the army possessed
prodigious authority and manpower.” 46 This shift from true neutrality was difficult for the ARC
to forget, as the military would not.
It has already been established as to the ease of disease transmittance within the military
camps, which similarly resulted in high infection rates amongst the soldiers and other personnel.
With standard medical personnel being overwhelmed by the number of cases, the Army naturally
called for reinforcements. Their chosen forces? The American Red Cross, who so generously
assisted them in times previous. While the ARC was happy to lend a hand where needed, there
was an unfortunate consequence. Since most trained personnel that the ARC had would be
distributed amongst military installations, this left very few to look after urban areas. This is a
further reflection as to the priorities that were set by military officials. While this decision might
be attributed to the perceived necessity to maintain the American war machine, it would lead to
severe urban problems once the pandemic spread. While the number of urban problems that
arose within the pandemic years are too great to fully examine within this essay, one in particular
will be discussed. The phenomena of parades was constant throughout America’s short interim in
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World War I, all of them shared a similar goal. Get people to buy war bonds and support the war
effort. Such financial efforts were deemed paramount for the success of the war effort, which
indicates that other priorities, such as public health, were shunted to the side.
Such attitude for maintaining military actions in Europe are reflected in the attitudes in
reference to war bonds. War bonds were an important cog in the military machine, where
Americans would buy these bonds as a way of financially supporting the government. While
there was the appeal of being eventually reimbursed once the war was over, it was seen as one’s
patriotic duty to buy war bonds. Dozens of parades were held during the course of the war,
where the sole intention was to sell as many war bonds as was possible. The parades were
designed to draw out the patriotic spirit within the American public, and they were massively
successful in doing so. They were deemed so important that many were held in spite of pandemic
warnings. Nothing could stop the parades, not even the clear threat of a disease which thrives
upon quick transmission within a crowd. “On September 28, 200,000 gathered to view the kickoff parade which stretched twenty-three blocks through the streets of the city [Philadelphia].
Singing-conductors and speakers were distributed among the marchers, and wherever the parade
halted, they led the crowd in patriotic songs and harangued them to buy bonds….” 47 The result
of the continuation of the parades led to an explosion of influenza within Philadelphia, with 635
new cases only a few days later. 48Despite the clear correlation between the parades and
pandemic explosions, they still continued to occur. Events such as these show more about the
American priority towards continuation of the war than merely as a blatant vector by which the
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influenza was transmitted. Parades continued across the country for the duration of the war, with
only occasional regard for the prevention of spreading influenza.
When considering public actions involving the pandemic, including bond parades and
occasional resistance to political decrees, it seems as though the public followed health protocols
because it served their patriotic interests. More often than not, Red Cross propaganda during the
war years looked very similar to military propaganda. The propaganda took on all kinds of
forms, with the most common being newspaper ads and illustrated posters. The following
example was taken from a 1918 poster that attempted to coax the viewer into enlisting: “Nursing
service is military service, and the trained nurse is as necessary to the successful prosecution of
the war as the trained soldier. Nurses, you are needed! Enlist for service now!” 49 If one might
recall the newspaper ad from the Dallas Morning News, the slogans appeared on more than
simple posters or fliers. Such sentiments were circulated nationally for the sole benefit of
recruiting nurses and coaxing donations from the population. The rhetoric that was used by the
ARC to recruit nurses echoed the methods used to recruit new soldiers. Both the ARC and the
military drew on the inherit patriotism that drove the American spirit in an attempt to pull as
many resources as they could. This is more than simple coincidence, as it reflects the blurring of
ARC neutrality in terms of political stance. They could not afford to be truly neutral during the
war, as offering assistance to the enemy would be seen as sedition. Because the ARC became
associated with the military, though a necessity, would also pressure them into being beholden to
the whims of the military. This included the appropriation of resources and personnel to affected
areas, and while the military was not in direct control over how the ARC distributed aid, they did
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reserve the right to refuse aid where they held jurisdiction. In a bizarre, and albeit isolated case,
ARC aid to a military installation was actually refused.
As part of a massive distribution project, the ARC sent impressive amounts of medical
equipment and supplies to military installations. On the long list of locations was an Army
hospital at the University of Columbus in Ohio. When ARC supplies and personnel reported to
the hospital, they were rebuffed by Colonel George L. Converse and told to leave the premises
immediately. “I want you to understand that this is a military hospital and we get our supplies
from the government,’ Colonel Converse is reported to have told McCune. ‘You have no
business nosing around our hospital without a proper permit and we don’t need your supplies.” 50
This might strike a contemporary viewer as extremely odd, as the logic used by the Colonel
appears to be faulty. At this moment in time the ARC was, for all intents and purposes, a direct
subsidy of the government and by further extent the military. It would not be a difficult task to
make the connection and thus invalidate Colonel Converse’s argument. What is important in this
circumstance is the fact that the argument was made at all. There could be a few reasons as to
why the Colonel acted in the way that he did. Firstly, the hospital could have been fully stocked
on supplies and therefore did not require more from a logistical standpoint. While this has some
logic behind it, there are problems as well. By this point the pandemic was in full swing
throughout much of the country and the military was especially aware of it. Therefore, the army
hospital would experience statistically higher percentages of patients and would require more
supplies than they would typically need during the average season. Ohio as a state would suffer
21,828 fatalities due to the pandemic during the last four months of 1918. 51 Columbus on its own
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would account for 781 of those deaths during the same period of time. 52 While the actual
conditions within the hospital are not known, the possibility that the hospital did not face the
same overwhelming conditions that other army hospitals experienced is doubtful.
So if the supplies were in fact needed, it could then be possible that Colonel Converse
was unaware that the ARC was operating in league with the military. If this was the case, then it
would be well within the right of Converse to deny non-government provisions that were not
authorized. Yet again, there is a flaw with this reasoning. Due to the centralized nature and
importance of maintaining connectivity between the military and the federal government, it is
difficult to imagine a scenario where a camp would not know about the relation between the
military and the ARC. Maintaining communication is imperative for a military to be successful
during wartime, even for something as apparently minor as ensuring supplies in an army hospital
are officially sanctioned. So if communications are maintained and the military officials are
informed as to the intentions of the ARC, that still does not reveal as to why they were turned
away.
The answer may lie in relation to the issue of communication, though on a less literal
basis. While the army was certainly informed that the ARC was working as a supportive role, it
is possible that they were still considered by some to be subservient. In the beginning of the
twentieth century, the ARC worked either with or under military direction, as their goals were
often aligned. However, this provided military officials to slowly degrade the traditional ARC
neutrality in terms of political alignment. Eventually, the ARC no longer acted on their own
terms, in reference to events such as the San Francisco earthquake, and instead acted on behalf of
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the military. When referring to a military which depended on a rigid hierarchy for success, it was
not difficult to place the ARC within the hierarchy. Based on the response of this particular
military official, that position is rather low. So low, in fact, that the ARC could not be considered
to be affiliated with the government. According to Colonel Converse, considering the ARC to be
an auxiliary group may have gone too far as to bringing them into the fold. Even when they are
needed the most, the ARC is still facing difficulties in receiving the recognition that they deserve
for their efforts.
By the time the pandemic burned itself out in 1920, America found itself battered and
bruised from two great calamities. Both the First World War and the Influenza pandemic resulted
in unprecedented loss of life and required a massive nationwide response. When traditional
methods failed, a new approach was necessary. Both the American Red Cross alongside its
military counterparts effectively joined together to combat the pandemic. Yet there was a price to
be paid for their combined success. In order to achieve their mission, the ARC had to effectively
give up its traditional stance on total neutrality. They became politically intertwined with the
national government, something which was not intended by Clara Barton, which would lead to
the eventual centralization of the disparate chapters. While the ARC was able to maintain most
of what made it such a successful humanitarian organization, it lost a part of itself that would be
difficult to retrieve. By becoming politicized, they gained the necessary resources to adequately
fight against the pandemic. Though the question as to whether or not this change was truly
necessary or not is another matter entirely.
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